This paper aims at answering the following two questions in privacy-preserving data analysis and publishing: What formal privacy guarantee (if any) does k-anonymization provide? How can we benefit from the adversary's uncertainty about the data? We have found that random sampling provides a connection that helps answer these two questions, as sampling can create uncertainty. The main result of the paper is that k-anonymization, when done "safely", and when preceded with a random sampling step, satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with reasonable parameters. This result illustrates that "hiding in a crowd of k" indeed offers some privacy guarantees. We point out, however, that almost all existing k-anonymization algorithms in the literature are not "safe". Regarding the second question, we provide both positive and negative results. On the positive side, we show that adding a random-sampling pre-processing step to a differentially-private algorithm can greatly amplify the level of privacy protection. Hence, when given a dataset resulted from sampling, one can utilize a much large privacy budget. On the negative side, any privacy notion that takes advantage of the adversary's uncertainty, likely does not compose.
INTRODUCTION
This paper aims at answering the following two questions in privacy-preserving data analysis and publishing. The first is: What formal privacy guarantee (if any) does kanonymization methods provide? k-Anonymization methods have been studied extensively in the database community, but have been known to lack strong privacy guarantees. The second question is: How can we benefit from the adversary's uncertainty about the data? More specifically, can we come up a meaningful relaxation of differential privacy [8, 9] by exploiting the adversary's uncertainty about the dataset? We now discuss these two motivations in more detail.
The k-anonymity notion was introduced by Sweeney and Samarati [30, 29, 27, 28] for privacy-preserving microdata publishing. This notion has been very influential. Many kanonymization methods have been developed over the last decades; it has also been extensively applied to other problems such as location privacy [14] . The k-anonymity notion requires that when only certain attributes, known as quasi-identifiers (QIDs), are considered, each tuple in a kanonymized dataset should appear at least k times. In this paper, we consider a version of k-anonymity which treats all attributes as QIDs. We show that even satisfying this strong version of k-anonymity does not protect against re-identification attacks. We then define classes of k-anonymization algorithms that are "safe", which avoid the privacy vulnerabilities of existing k-anonymization algorithms. One question we answer in this paper is "Can these safe k-anonymization methods provide strong privacy guarantee?"
The notion of differential privacy was introduced by Dwork et al. [8, 11] . An algorithm A satisfies ǫ-Differential Privacy (ǫ-DP) if and only if for any two neighboring datasets D and D ′ , the distributions of A(D) and A(D ′ ) differ at most by a multiplicative factor of e ǫ . A relaxed version of ǫ-DP, which we use (ǫ, δ)-DP to denote, allows an error probability bounded by δ. Satisfying differential privacy ensures that even if the adversary has full knowledge of the values of a tuple t, as well as full knowledge of what other tuples are in the dataset, and is only uncertain about whether t is in the input dataset, the adversary cannot tell whether t is in the dataset or not beyond a certain confidence level. As in most data publishing scenarios, the adversary is unlikely to have precise information about all other tuples in a dataset. It is desirable to exploit this uncertainty to define a relaxed version of differential privacy, which can be easier to satisfy.
An interesting question is whether safe k-anonymization can achieve some version of (possibly relaxed) differential privacy. Differential privacy can be satisfied by adding random noise to query answers. Most k-anonymization methods can be viewed as returning the counts of tuples in different regions in a deterministic fashion: if the count is at or above a threshold k, then return the count; otherwise, return 0. Hence the question is: Does returning exact counts that are large enough satisfy some variants of differential privacy?
We have found that sampling provides the link between our two goals. The main result in this paper is that sampling plus "safe" k-anonymization satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP. We point out that our result cannot be used to justify the privacy guarantees of existing k-anonymization methods, because almost all of them are not safe. Instead, our result points out that if one wants to use k-anonymization, and wants to satisfy differential privacy, what one can do is to first make the kanonymization method safe, and then apply it to datasets resulted from sampling.
This result leads us to study the relationship between sampling and differential privacy. We say that an algorithm satisfies differential privacy under sampling if the algorithm preceded with a random sampling step satisfies differential privacy. Results about differential privacy under sampling are both of theoretical interest and have practical relevance. Sampling is a natural way to model the adversary's uncertainty about the data; thus, this helps understanding how to take advantage of this uncertainty in private data analysis. On the practical side, many data publishing scenarios already involve a random sampling step. Sometimes this sampling step is explicit, when one has a large dataset and wishes to release only a much smaller version for research, such as the US census bureau's 1-percent Public Use Microdata Sample. Sometimes, this sampling step is implicit; because the respondents are randomly selected, one can view the dataset as resulted from sampling.
The relationship between sampling and differential privacy has been studied before. Chauduri and Mishra [6] studied the privacy effect of sampling, and showed a linear relationship between the sampling probability and the error probability δ. Their result says that when a dataset contains few items that are infrequent, then publishing a sampling from the dataset satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Their result suggests an approach to perform first k-anonymization and then sampling as the last step. We instead consider the approach of perform sampling as the first step and then kanonymization. Our result suggests that the latter approach benefits much more from the sampling.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We prove that a safe k-anonymization algorithm, when preceded by a random sampling step, provides (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with reasonable parameters.
In the literature, k-anonymization and differential privacy have been viewed as very different privacy guarantees: k-anonymization is syntactic, and differential privacy is algorithmic and provides semantic privacy guarantees. Our result links k-anonymization with differential privacy.
This result also provides a new way of satisfying differential privacy. Existing techniques for satisfying differential privacy rely on output perturbation, that is, adding noise to the query outputs. Our result suggests an alternative approach. Rather than adding noise to the output, one can add a random sampling step in the beginning and prune results that are too sensitive to changes of individual tuples (i.e., tuples that violate k-anonymity). Comparing the utility of these two approaches is interesting future research direction and is beyond the scope of this paper.
• We show both positive and negative results on utilizing the adversary's uncertainty about the data. On the positive side, we show that random sampling has a privacy amplification effect for (ǫ, δ)-DP. For an algorithm that satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP, adding a sampling step with probability β reduces both e ǫ − 1 and δ by a factor of β. For example, applying an algorithm that achieves (ln 2 ≈ 0.69)-differential privacy on a dataset sampled with 0.1 probability can achieve overall (ln 1.1 ≈ 0.095)-differential privacy.
On the negative side, we show that any privacy notion that exploits the adversary's uncertainty about the data is unlikely to compose, in the sense that publishing the output from two algorithms together may be non-private.
Our results suggest the following approaches to take advantage of the fact that the input dataset is resulted from explicit or implicit sampling. If one applies algorithms that satisfy (ǫ, δ)-DP, then one can allow a larger privacy budget because of sampling. If one applies an algorithm that does not satisfy (ǫ, δ)-DP, but satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP under sampling, then it is safe to apply the algorithm once. This is useful in the noninteractive setting where one publishes an anonymized or synthesized version of the dataset.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We study the relationship between differential privacy and sampling in Section 2. We study k-anonymization and prove our main result in Section 3. We discuss related work in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5. An appendix includes proofs not found in the main body.
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY UNDER SAMPLING
Differential privacy formalizes the following protection objective: if a disclosure occurs when an individual participates in the database, then the same disclosure also occurs with similar probability (within a small multiplicative factor) even when the individual does not participate. 
Intuitively, ǫ-DP offers strong privacy protection. If A satisfies ǫ-DP, one can claim that publishing A(D) does not violate the privacy of any tuple t in D, because even if one leaves t out of the dataset, in which case the privacy of t can be considered to be protected, one may still publish the same outputs with a similar probability.
In the literature, ǫ-DP is often relaxed to allow a small error probability δ. This can accommodate algorithms that satisfy Inequality 1 with high probability. 
Existing methods to satisfy differential privacy include adding Laplace noise proportional to the query's global sensitivity [8, 11] , adding noise related to the smooth bound of the query's local sensitivity [26] , and the exponential mechanism to select a result among all possible results [25] .
Uncertain Background Knowledge
One of our goals is to investigate how to define a relaxation of differential privacy that exploits the adversary's uncertainty about the underlying dataset. The (ǫ, δ)-DP notion ensures that when an adversary is uncertain about whether one tuple t is present in the input dataset, even when the adversary knows the precise information of all other tuples in the input dataset, the adversary cannot tell based on the output whether t is in the input or not. We believe that it is reasonable to relax the assumption to that the adversary knows all attributes of a tuple t (but not whether t is in the dataset), and in addition statistical information about the rest of the dataset D. The privacy notion should prevent such an adversary from substantially distinguishing between D and D ∪ {t} based on the output.
The desire to exploit adversary's uncertainty is shared by other researchers. For example, Adam Smith's blog post 1 summarizing the Workshop on Statistical and LearningTheoretic Challenges in Data Privacy includes a section on relaxed definitions of privacy with meaningful semantics: "it would be nice to see meaningful definitions of privacy in statistical databases that exploit the adversary's uncertainty about the data. The normal approach to this is to specify a set of allowable prior distributions on the data (from the adversary's point of view). However, one has to be careful. The versions I have seen are quite brittle."
It appears that some degree of brittleness is unavoidable. It appears that any privacy notion that takes advantage of the adversary's uncertainty about the data is not robust under composition, which requires that given two algorithms that both satisfy the privacy notion, their composition, i.e., applying both algorithms to the same input dataset and then publishing both outputs, also satisfies the privacy notion.
Consider the following two algorithms. Let r(D) be the predicate that D contains an odd number of tuples, and s(D) be a sensitive predicate, e.g., whether a tuple t is in D. Algorithm A1(D) outputs r(D), and A2(D) outputs r(D) XOR s(D). Both A1 and A2 should satisfy a privacy notion that assumes that the adversary is uncertain about the data, because there is no reason that the adversary should know whether the number of the tuples is odd or even. However, the composition of A1 and A2 leaks r(D). More generally, for any privacy definition that exploits the adversary's uncertainty about the dataset, one should be able to find a predicate that the adversary has little reason to bias the answer one way or the other. Then, one algorithm can output that predicate, and a second algorithm can output that predicate XOR'ed with a predicate that results in privacy leakage; and they do not compose.
The above observation suggests that no definition that exploits uncertain background knowledge should be used in the interactive setting of answering multiple queries. If, however, one intends to publish a dataset in the non-interactive setting only once, then the inability to compose may be an acceptable limitation.
Differential Privacy under Sampling
One natural approach to capturing the adversary's uncertainty about the input data is to add a sampling step. We introduce the following definition, called (β, ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy under Sampling ((β, ǫ, δ)-DPS for short).
Definition 3 (Differential privacy under sampling).

An algorithm A gives (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS if and only if the algorithm A
β gives (ǫ, δ)-DP, where A β denotes the algorithm to first sample with probability β (include each tuple in the input dataset with probability β), and then apply A to the sampled dataset.
In Section 3, we show that existing k-anonymization algorithms that have privacy vulnerabilities do not satisfy (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS; further, safe (and possibly deterministic) k-anonymization satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, while violating (ǫ, δ)-DP for any δ < 1.
The Amplification Effect of Sampling
An interesting feature of the (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS notion is that there is a connection between the privacy parameters ǫ, δ and the sampling rate β. The following theorem shows that by employing a smaller sampling rate, one can achieve a stronger privacy protection (i.e., smaller values for ǫ and δ). Theorem 1. Any algorithm that satisfies (β1, ǫ1, δ1)-DPS also satisfies (β2, ǫ2, δ2)-DPS for any β2 < β1, where ǫ2 = ln 1 +
See Appendix A.1 for the proof. An equivalent way to write ǫ2 is
. In other words, by decreasing the sampling probability, one obtains proportional decreases in e ǫ − 1 and δ, improving the privacy protection. Hence, when one possesses a randomly sampled dataset, one can use much relaxed privacy budget ǫ and error tolerance δ. To see the effects of this, in Table 1 we show the privacy parameters for an algorithm that satisfies (ln 11, 10 −5 )-DP, and an algorithm that satisfies (1, 0)-DP under sampling rate 0.1 and 0.01.
Smith's blog 2 includes an "amplification" lemma for differential privacy, which was used implicitly in the design of a PAC learner for the parity class in [17] . The lemma states that an algorithm that satisfies (ǫ = 1)-DP, when preceded by random sampling with rate β, satisfies (2β)-DP. Theorem 1 exploits similar observations, but is more general in that it applies to (ǫ, δ)-DP, rather than ǫ-DP, and that it also applies to arbitrary values of ǫ. Our result is also slightly tighter; for example, for the special case of ǫ = 1 and β = 0.1, we give a result of 0.159 as opposed to 2β = 0.2.
Properties of (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS
While the (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS notion does not compose, it does have several other desirable properties. In [19] , Kifer and Lin identified two privacy axioms when they defined the generic differential privacy. The Transformation Invariance axiom states that given an algorithm A that satisfies a privacy notion, adding any post-processing step operating on A's output should still satisfy the privacy notion. The Privacy Axiom of Choice axiom states that given two algorithms A1 and A2 that both satisfy a privacy notion, then a new algorithm that chooses A1 with probability p and A2 with probability 1 − p should also satisfy the notion. Below we show that (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS satisfies both axioms.
We note, however, that DPS does not appear to be an instance of the abstract differential privacy framework in [19] . Abstract differential privacy generalizes differential privacy in two ways: First, one can specify a binary predicate over input datasets to define which two datasets D and D ′ are considered to be neighbors. That is, they do not have to be differing in only one tuple. Second, for each pair of neighboring D and D ′ , one can specify a binary predicate
is TRUE. DPS adds a sampling step to the input dataset before applying A. Hence DPS is not placing a constraint on the outputs of A on two individual datasets; instead the constraint is on A's outputs on two related distributions of datasets. 
Rewriting the above inequality, we have
Consider the sum over S2, we have
Subtracting the above from previous,
For each S ∈ S1, we have p(S)(1 − q(S)) > e ǫ p ′ (S)(1 − q(S)), and thus
. Summing up the above two inequalities, we have
Theorem 3. Given two algorithms A1 and A2 that both satisfy (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, for any p ∈ [0, 1], let Ap(D) be the algorithm that outputs A1(D) with probability p and A2(D) with probability 1 − p, then Ap satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS.
Proof. Since both A1 and A2 satisfy (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS, for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D ′ and for any O ∈ Range(A1) ∪ Range(A2), we have
Therefore, the algorithm Ap also satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS.
Benefiting from Sampling
We observe that in many data publishing scenarios, random sampling is an inherent step. For example, the census bureau publishes a 1-percent microdata sample. In many research settings (such as when Netflix wants to publish movie ratings), it is sufficient to publish a random sample of the dataset. Many times, even when the dataset is not the result of explicit sampling, one can view it as result of implicit sampling, because the process of selecting respondents involves randomness. Intuitively, uncertainty resulted from such explicit and implicit sampling provides some degree of privacy protection.
The notion of Differential Privacy under Sampling provides two approaches such that one can benefit from sampling. The first approach is to apply Theorem 1, and obtain an enhanced privacy budget. For example, suppose that one wants to satisfy ǫ-DP for ǫ = 0.1, but one knows that the dataset is resulted from 1% random sampling, then one can instead use the privacy budget ǫ = ln(100(e 0.1 − 1) + 1) ≈ 2.44, a 24-fold increase. While this benefit of sampling is known, we provide a general formula to quantify this effect for all values of (ǫ, δ). This approach of benefiting from sampling can be applied in both the interactive or the noninteractive setting.
In the second approach, if one knows the dataset to be published is resulted from sampling, and aims at publish the dataset in a non-interactive setting, then one can apply a mechanism that satisfies DPS, but not (ǫ, δ)-DP. One example of such a mechanism is a safe k-anonymization method, which we will study in Section 3. In this paper, we provide theoretical justification of this approach. Comparing the utility of this approach against that of other differentially private approaches is beyond the scope of this paper.
An Analysis of k-Anonymity
The development of k-anonymity was motivated by a well publicized privacy incident [30] . The Group Insurance Commission (GIC) published a supposedly anonymized dataset recording the medical visits of patients managed under its insurance plan. While the obvious personal identifiers (such as name and address) were removed, the published data included zip code, date of birth, and gender, which are sufficient to uniquely identify a significant fraction of the population. Sweeney [30] showed that by correlating this data with the publicly available Voter Registration List for Cambridge Massachusetts, medical visits for many individuals can be easily identified, including those of William Weld, a former governor of Massachusetts. We note that even without access to the public voter registration list, the same privacy breaches can occur. Many individuals' birthdate, gender and zip code are public information. This is especially the case with the advent of social media, including Facebook, where users share seemingly innocuous personal information to the public. The GIC re-identification attack directly motivated the development of the k-anonymity privacy notion. Quasi-identifiers vs. Sensitive Attributes? A first problem with Definition 4 is that it requires the division of all attributes into quasi-identifiers (QIDs) and sensitive attributes (SA), where the adversary is assumed to know the QIDs, but not SAs. This separation, however, is very hard to obtain in practice. Even though only some attributes are used in the GIC incident, it is difficult to assume that they are the only QIDs. Other attributes in the GIC data include visit date, diagnosis, etc. There may well exist an adversary who knows this information about some individuals, and if with this knowledge these individuals' record can be reidentified, it is still a serious privacy breach.
The same difficulty is true for publishing any kind of census, medical, or transactional data. When publishing anonymized microdata, one has to defend against all kinds of adversaries, some know one set of attributes, and others know different sets. An attribute about one individual may be known by some adversaries, and unknown (and should be considered sensitive) for other adversaries.
Any separation between QIDs and SAs is essentially making assumptions about the adversary's background knowledge that can be easily violated, rendering any privacy protection invalid. Hence we consider a strengthened version of k-anonymity by treating all attributes as QIDs. This is stronger than using any subset of attributes as QIDs. This strengthened version of k-anonymity avoids making assumption about the adversary's background knowledge about which attributes are known and what are not. This has been used in the context of anonymizing transaction data [16] .
Weakness of the k-Anonymity Notion.
With the strengthened version of k-anonymity, one might expect that it should stop re-identification attacks. To satisfy this notion, each tuple in the output is blended in a group of at least k tuples that are the same. This follows the appealing principle that "privacy means hiding in a crowd". The intuition is that as there are at least k − 1 other tuples that look exactly the same, one cannot re-identify which tuple in the output corresponds to an individual with probability over 1/k. Unfortunately, this intuition turns out to be wrong. Only making the syntactic requirement that each tuple appears at least k times does not protect privacy, as a trivial way to satisfy this is to select some tuples from the input and then duplicate each of them k times.
k-Anonymity vs. k-Anonymization Algorithms. Here we would like to make a clear distinction between the k-anonymity, the privacy notion, and k-anonymization algorithms.
Many k-anonymization algorithms have been developed in the literature. Given input datasets, they aim at producing anonymized versions of the input datasets that satisfy k-anonymity. That the k-anonymity privacy notion is weak means that producing outputs that satisfying k-anonymity alone is insufficient for privacy protection. However, this does not automatically mean that all k-anonymization have privacy vulnerabilities. We now show that the algorithms that have been developed in the literature are indeed vulnerable to re-identification attacks. Consider the following anonymization scheme, which represents several proposed algorithms for k-anonymity [5, 21] . [21] . One could also use some clustering method based on some distance measurement (e.g., [5] Similar weaknesses exist for other k-anonymization algorithm in the literature, for example, those computing a generalization scheme based on the input dataset [16] . With all these algorithms, the presence and non-presence of some extreme values will affect the resulted generalization scheme, leaking information.
Algorithm 1. [Clustering and Local Recoding (CLR)]: First, group input tuples into clusters such that each cluster has at least k tuples. For example, one method of grouping is the Mondrian algorithm
As these algorithms are sensitive to the presence of a single tuple with extreme values, they do not satisfy (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS when β > δ, since sampling with β will result the presence of the tuple selected with probability β.
"Safe" k-Anonymization
k-Anonymization algorithms can be viewed as consisting of two steps. In the first step, the algorithm outputs a partitioning over the space of all tuples, and chooses a representative tuple for each partition (which can be generalized values of the partition). In the second step, the algorithm outputs how many tuples there are in each partition, outputting 0 when a partition contains fewer than k tuples. Outputs from the two steps are combined to produce the output dataset.
The privacy vulnerability of the CLR algorithm and other existing k-anonymization algorithm occurs in the first step. How the space is partitioned and how the representative tuples are chosen can be sensitive to the presence of a single tuple that has extreme values. Hence the output violates privacy.
To avoid such privacy vulnerability, we consider kanonymization algorithms for which the first step satisfies ǫ-DP. We say that a k-anonymization algorithm A is ǫ-safe when its first step satisfies ǫ-DP.
A special case of ǫ-safe k-anonymization algorithms is when the first step of the algorithm does not depend on dataset D, in which case we say that the algorithm is strongly safe. An example of a strongly-safe kanonymization algorithm is to always use the same grid to partition the tuple space. Such a method is similar to histogram methods; the difference is that k-anonymization publishes accurate counts.
An example of an ǫ-safe method is to consider various possible generalization schemes, use a quality function to assign a quality to each of them, and then use the exponential mechanism [25] to differentially privately select a generalization scheme that gives good utility.
Intuitively a strongly-safe k-anonymization algorithm provides some level of privacy protection, and the level of privacy protection increases with larger values of k. If any individual's tuple is published, there must exist at least k − 1 other tuples in the input database that are the same under the recoding scheme; furthermore, the recoding scheme does not depend on the dataset, and one sees only the results of the recoding. Hence in this input dataset, the individual is hidden in a crowd of at least k. However, the following proposition shows that strongly safe k-anonymization algorithms do not satisfy (ǫ, δ)-DP unless they are degenerate, which we now define.
Definition 5. We say that a strongly-safe kanonymization algorithm is degenerate if and only if in the first step, it chooses the same representative tuple for all partitions.
A special case is an algorithm that outputs a single partition that includes all possible tuples. Intuitively, such algorithms suppress all information about a dataset (except for how many tuples it includes) and provide absolute privacy guarantees; however, they are useless in practice. 
Privacy of Safe k-Anonymization
We now show that strongly-safe k-anonymization algorithm satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for a small δ with reasonable values of k and β. We use f (j; n, β) to denote the probability mass function for the binomial distribution; that is, f (j; n, β) gives the probability of getting exactly j successes in n trials where each trial succeeds with probability β. And we use F (j; n, β) to denote the cumulative probability mass function; that is, F (j; n, β) = The function d relates the four parameters ǫ, β, k, δ by requiring δ = d(k, β, ǫ). Note that the other requirement is that ǫ ≥ − ln(1 − β). Among the four parameters, ǫ and δ define the level of privacy protection, while k and β affect the quality of anonymized data. We now examine the relationships among these four parameters.
To compute this, we want to find n ≥ k γ − 1 that maximizes n j>γn f (j; n, β). We first observe that γ > β because
e ǫ > 0. That is, n j>γn f (j; n, β) sums up the tail binomial distribution probabilities for the portion of the tail beyond γn, as shown in Figure 1 . Following the intuition behind the law of large numbers, the larger the value of n, the smaller this tail probability. Hence intuitively, choosing the smallest value of n, i.e., n = nm = k γ − 1 should maximize the formula. Unfortunately, due to the discrete nature of the binomial distribution, the maximum value may not be reached at nm, but instead at one of the next few local maximal points We now report the relationships among ǫ, β, k, δ using numerical computation. In Table 2 , we fix k = 20 and report the values of δ under different ǫ and β values. The table shows that the values of δ can be very small. We note that with fixed k and β, δ decreases as ǫ increases, which states that the error probability gets smaller when one relaxes the ǫ-bound on the probability ratio. In other words, the more serious a privacy breach, the more unlikely it occurs. The table also shows that with fixed k and ǫ, δ decreases as β decreases, meaning that a smaller sampling probability improves the privacy protection.
In Figure 2 , we show the results from examining the relationship between ǫ and δ when we vary k ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30, 50} under fixed β = 0.2. We plot In Figure 3 , we show the results from examining the effect of varying β ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4} under a fixed value of k = 20. This shows that decreasing β also dramatically improve the privacy protection. The two figures indicate the intricate relationship between privacy and utility.
In Figure 4 , we explore this phenomenon that increasing k and decreasing β both improve privacy protection. Starting from (k = 15, β = 0.05), each time we double β and find a value k that gives a similar level of privacy protection. We finds that k increases from 15 to 22 (for β = 0.1), 35 (for β = 0.2), and 60 (for β = 0.4).
In Figure 5 , we examine the quality of privacy protection for very small k's (from 1 to 5). We choose a very small sampling probability of β = 0.025. Not surprisingly, when k = 1, the privacy protection is entirely from the sampling effect, as the obtained δ value is less than β. However, when k ≥ 2, we start seeing privacy protection effect from k-anonymization, with δ (< 0.001) significantly smaller than β = 0.025 when ǫ = 2.
Finally, in Figure 6 we show the relationship between the privacy parameter ǫ and the utility parameter k if we set the requirement that δ ≤ 10 −6 . The figure shows that smaller values of ǫ can be satisfied for larger values of k. Furthermore, the effect of β over ǫ is quite substantial.
The following theorem shows that ǫ-safe k-Anonymization also satisfies (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS. 
Remarks of the Result
Theorems 5 and 6 show that k-anonymization, when done safely, and when preceded by a random sampling step, can satisfy (ǫ, δ)-DP with reasonable parameters. In the literature, k-anonymization and differential privacy have been viewed as very different privacy guarantees. kanonymization achieves weak syntactic privacy, and differential privacy provides strong semantic privacy guarantees. Our result links k-anonymization with differential privacy, and suggest that the "hiding in a crowd of k" privacy principle, which is used widely in contexts other than privacypreserving publishing of relational data, including location privacy and publishing of social network data, network packets, and other types of data, indeed offers some privacy guarantees when used correctly.
We also observe that another way to interpret our result is that this provides another method to achieve differential privacy. Existing methods for satisfying differential privacy mostly take the form of output perturbation. Our result suggests an alternative approach: Rather than adding noises to the output, one can add a random sampling step in the beginning and prune results that are too sensitive to changes of a single individual tuple (i.e., tuples that violate k-anonymity). In other words, when the dataset is resulted from random sampling, then one can answer count queries accurately provided that the result is large enough. An intriguing question is whether other input perturbation techniques (such as directly adding noises to attribute values) can be used in combination with k-anonymization to satisfy differential privacy as well.
RELATED WORK
A lot of work on privacy-preserving data publishing considers privacy notions that are weaker than differential privacy. These approaches typically assume an adversary that knows only some aspects of the dataset (background knowledge) and tries to prevent it from learning some other aspects. One can always attack such a privacy notion by changing either what the adversary already knows, or changing what the adversary tries to learn. The most prominent among these notions is k-anonymity [30, 29] . Some followup notions include l-diversity [23] and t-closeness [22] . In this paper, we analyze the weaknesses of k-anonymity in detail, and argue that a separation between QIDs and sensitive attributes are difficult to obtain in practice, challenging the foundation of privacy notions such as l-diversity, t-closeness, and other ones centered on attribute disclosure prevention.
The notion of differential privacy was developed in a series of works [7, 13, 3, 11, 8] . It represents a major breakthrough in privacy-preserving data analysis. In an attempt to make differential privacy more amenable to more sensitive queries, several relaxations have been developed, including (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [7, 13, 3, 11] . Three basic general approaches to achieve differential privacy are adding Laplace noise proportional to the query's global sensitivity [8, 11] , adding noise related to the smooth bound of the query's local sensitivity [26] , and the exponential mechanism to select a result among all possible results [25] . A survey on these results can be found in [9] . Our approach suggests an alterative by using input perturbation rather than output perturbation to add uncertainty to the adversary's knowledge of the data.
Random sampling [1, 2] has been studied as a method for privacy preserving data mining, where privacy notions other than differential privacy were used. The relationship between sampling and differential privacy has been explored before. Chauduri and Mishra [6] studied the privacy effect of sampling, and showed a linear relationship between the sampling probability and the error probability δ. Their result suggests an approach to perform first k-anonymization and then sampling as the last step. We instead consider the approach of perform sampling as the first step and then kanonymization. Our result suggests that the latter approach benefits much more from the sampling.
There exists some work on publishing microdata while satisfying (ǫ, δ)-DP or its variant. Machanavajjhala et al. [24] introduced a variant of (ǫ, δ)-DP called (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy and showed that it is satisfied by a synthetic data generation method for the problem of releasing the commuting patterns of the population in the United States. This notion is stronger than (ǫ, δ)-DP. Korolova et al. [20] considered publishing search queries and clicks that achieves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. A similar approach for releasing query logs with differential privacy was proposed by Götz et al. [15] . These approaches apply the output perturbation technique in differential privacy to microdata publishing scenarios that can be reduced to histogram publishing at their core. Blum et al. [4] and Dwork et al. [12] considered outputing synthetic data generation that is useful for a particular class of queries. These papers do not deal with the relationship between k-anonymization and differential privacy, or between sampling and k-anonymization.
Kifer and Lin [19] developed a general framework to characterize relaxation of differential privacy. They identified two axioms for a privacy definition: Transformation Invariance and Privacy Axiom of Choice, which are satisfied by (β, ǫ, δ)-DPS. They did not consider the composability of these notions, which was our emphasis, as a clear understanding of the composability issues directs us what can and cannot be done with sampled dataset.
CONCLUSIONS
We have answered the two questions we set out in the beginning of the paper. We take the approach of starting from both k-anonymization and differential privacy and trying to meet in the middle. On the one hand, we identify weaknesses in the k-anonymity notion and existing kanonymization methods and propose the notion of safe kanonymization to avoid these privacy vulnerabilities. On the other hand, we try to relax differential privacy to take advantage of the adversary's uncertainty of the data. The key insight underlying our results is that random sampling can be used to bridge this gap between k-anonymization and differential privacy.
We have explored both the power and potential pitfalls to take advantage of sampling in private data analysis or publishing. Our results show that sampling, when used correctly, is a powerful tool that can greatly benefit differential privacy, as it creates uncertainty for the adversary. Sampling can increase the privacy budget and error toleration bound. Sampling also enables the usage of algorithms such as safe k-anonymization. An intriguing open question is whether there exist approaches other than sampling that can create uncertainty for the adversary, that can tolerate answering ǫ-DP queries.
APPENDIX
A. PROOFS
This appendix includes proofs not included in the main body.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1.
Given an algorithm A that satisfies (β1, ǫ1, δ1)-DPS, A also satisfies (β2, ǫ2, δ2)-DPS for any β2 < β1, where ǫ2 = ln 1 + Proof. We need to show that the algorithm A β 2 satisfies (ǫ2, δ2)-DP. Let β = β 2 β 1 . The algorithm A β 2 can be viewed as first sampling with probability β, then followed by applying the algorithm A β 1 , which satisfies (ǫ1, δ1)-DP. To analyze Z, we note that all the T 's that resulted from sampling from D with probability β can be divided into those in which t is not sampled, and those in which t is sampled. For a T in the former case, we have = e ǫ 1 X + δ1. Z = (1 − β)X + βY ≤ (1 − β)X + β(e ǫ 1 X + δ1) ≤ (1 − β + βe ǫ 1 )X + βδ1 = e ǫ 2 X + δ2.
To show that X ≤ e ǫ 2 Z + δ2, we observe that A satisfies (β1, ǫ1, δ1)-DPS means that X ≤ e ǫ 1 Y + δ1 and hence Z = (1 − β)X + βY ≥ (1 − β)X + βe −ǫ 1 (X − δ1), and
We now show that 1 1 − β + βe −ǫ 1 ≤ e ǫ 2 =ln 1+ Proof. Let A denote the algorithm, and g be the dataindependent generalization procedure in the algorithm. For any dataset D, any tuple t ∈ D, and for any output S. For any ǫ ≥ − ln(1 − β), we show that the probability by which
is violated is δ. Note that this is a stronger version of (ǫ, δ)-DP than the one in Definition 2. See [18] for relationship between the two. Let n be the number of t ′ in D such that g(t ′ ) = g(t). Let j be the number of times that g(t) appears in S. Note that as the only difference between D and D−t is that D has one extra copy of t, we have. .
Because F (k − 1; n, β) is always less than F (k − 1; n − 1, β); ≥ (1 − β). Because ǫ ≥ − ln(1 − β), we have e −ǫ ≤ 1 − β; hence under the case when j = 0, inequality (2) is satisfied.
When j ≥ k, we have
